Me on PBS, Explaining Cyberattacks on Banks
My latest appearance on our local PBS affiliate WGBY’s program Connecting Point, this time explaining cyberattacks on banks (not a how-to!) — first segment.
Category Archives: Security
Internet Hacker Danger!
Maybe not that scary, but probably should check your computer just in case: me on WGBY explaining about the DNS Changer Trojan Horse:
UMass Professor Emery Berger discusses recent reports of internet hacking that could leave thousands of Americans with “infected” internet connections and lead to internet disconnection this July. How can you know if your computer is affected?
Me on PBS: “Cyberterrorism” Interview
Me on WGBY: “cyberterrorism”, DoS attacks, botnets, SOPA + my not at all cynical take on politicians and the legislative process!
On NPR: UMass Cybersecurity Expert (me) Examines Zappos Security Breach
My interview today with our NPR affiliate New England Public Radio went from Zappos to broader security to a discussion of the End Times (more or less)!
http://www.nepr.net/news/umass-cyber-security-expert-examines-zappos-security-breach
Cybersecurity interview on PBS
From PBS affiliate WGBY: University of Mass. Prof. of Computer Science Emery Berger discusses cyber security and what we can do to protect our information from computer hackers.
DieHarder
My student Gene and I have just submitted a paper on the Most. Secure. Heap. Ever. 🙂 We plan to release the code soon, initially for Linux platforms. It’s a variant of the DieHard allocator, but with a number of key improvements that make it far more secure – better than all allocators we know of (something the analytical framework in this paper lets us actually evaluate). Missing are some new benchmark results showing that DieHarder performs about as well as or better than the OpenBSD allocator for a number of insanely allocation-intensive programs. Feedback welcome.
DieHarder: Securing the Heap
Gene Novark and Emery D. BergerHeap-based attacks depend on a combination of memory management errors and an exploitable memory allocator. We analyze a range of widely-deployed memory allocators, including those used in Windows, Linux, FreeBSD, and OpenBSD. We show that despite numerous efforts to improve their security, they remain vulnerable to attack. We present the design and security analysis of DieHarder, a memory allocator that provides the highest degree of security from heap-based attacks of any practical allocator.UMass CS Tech Report 2010-033
